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Chapter 287: Religious Accommodation for Employees
David Vidal
Code Sections Affected
Government Code §§ 12926, 12940 (amended).
AB 1964 (Yamada); 2012 STAT. Ch. 287.
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2011, a Sikh man settled a religious discrimination lawsuit he had
brought against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
1
(CDCR) for $295,000. The plaintiff, Trilochan Oberoi, alleged that the CDCR
denied him employment because he would not shave his religiously mandated
2
beard. Oberoi successfully completed all requirements for employment except
for a “respirator fit-test,” which required employees to be clean-shaven in order
3
to wear emergency gas masks. A twenty-six year veteran of the Indian Navy,
4
Oberoi had previously worn gas masks effectively by rolling up his beard. The
CDCR, however, continued to deny Oberoi religious accommodation despite
numerous requests and a 2008 State Personnel Board ruling that the CDCR
5
should attempt to make accommodations.
Reports indicate that religious discrimination in the workplace is rising in the
6
United States. Sikhs, Muslims, and Jews are particularly vulnerable due to
7
obvious dress or grooming practices that identify their religion. Chapter 287
amends the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by requiring employers
to accommodate a broad definition of religious dress and grooming practices

1. Brian Sumers, Sikh Wins Settlement with Prisons over Beard, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 27, 2011, at 4.
2. Amended Complaint at 5–9, Oberoi v. Dep’t of Corrections and Rehabilitation, No. 34-200900054595 (Sacramento Super. Ct., filed July 31, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. Id. at 5; see also SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 6 (June 18,
2012) (describing the prison policy that employees should be clean shaven in order for the gas mask to have a
tight seal around the mouth).
4. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 6 (June 18, 2012).
5. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 5–7; SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 1964, at 6–7 (June 18, 2012); Sumers, supra note 1.
6. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 5 (June 18, 2012)
(reporting that in 2011, religious-based claims submitted to the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
rose over 9.5 percent).
7. Id. at 6; see also Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.
eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(describing obvious dress and grooming practices to include “wearing particular head coverings or other
religious dress (such as a Jewish yarmulke or a Muslim headscarf), or wearing certain hairstyles or facial hair
(such as Rastafarian dreadlocks or Sikh uncut hair and beard)”).
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8

without segregating employees. Chapter 287 also clarifies the California
9
standard of reasonable accommodation under FEHA.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
California’s FEHA has a higher standard for religious accommodation in the
workplace than the federal standard under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
10
1964, but FEHA is also less explicit in its range of protection. This section
discusses the similarities, differences, and confusion between the respective
11
protection and religious practices under the two laws.
A. Federal Religious Protection
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) protects employees from
12
religious discrimination. Under Title VII, an employer must reasonably
accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless such accommodation
13
would be an undue hardship on the employer’s business. The United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) develops and enforces the
14
“policies defining the nature of employment discrimination.” The EEOC
includes religious dress and grooming practices among the religious practices an
employer must reasonably accommodate unless it would be an undue hardship on
15
the employer’s business. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted

8. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(p) (amended by Chapter 287); see also Jack Katzanek, Bill Protecting
Religious Garb Passes Assembly, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (May 29, 2012, 4:22 PM), http://www.pe.com/business/
business-headlines/20120529-workplace-bill-protecting-religious-garb-passes-assembly.ece (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the bill “was supported by a broad collation of religious affiliations”);
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 2 (June 18, 2012) (noting that religious
dress and grooming practice “shall be broadly construed” in the bill).
9. Id. § 12940(l)(1) (amended by Chapter 287); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24, 2012) (describing the difference between the federal and
state standards of religious accommodation).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006); GOV’T §§ 12926, 12940 (West Supp. 2012). Compare ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24, 2012) (describing how the
FEHA requirement is more protective than federal law), with id. at 3 (noting that FEHA has not recognized
clothing and hairstyles as religious observance in the same way as the EEOC).
11. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8
(Apr. 18, 2012) (identifying the Sikh Coalition’s argument for clarity in FEHA).
12. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 3–4 (June 18, 2012); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (defining “religion” as “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business”).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 3–4
(June 18, 2012).
14. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (June 18, 2012).
15. Id.
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“undue hardship” as anything more than de minimus costs to the employer, a
16
relatively low standard. One federal court determined that the Supreme Court
“strongly suggests that the undue hardship test is not a difficult threshold to
17
pass.” The Third Circuit, for example, found that a headscarf worn by a female
police officer as a part of her Muslim faith was an undue hardship to
18
accommodate because it violated the dress code of the police department. In
addition, the First Circuit held that non-economic costs such as harm to public
19
image could also meet the de minimis standard of undue hardship.
20
The Sikh Coalition, an organization advocating for civil rights, also
expresses concern over the federal interpretation of what constitutes a
21
“reasonable accommodation.” Some federal courts interpret “reasonable
accommodation” in a way that allows employers to segregate visibly religious
22
employees. In particular, Birdi v. UAL Corp. held that placing the Sikh plaintiff
23
away from the view of customers was a “reasonable accommodation.”
B. California Religious Protection
24

California’s FEHA prohibits discrimination against religious creed. The
definition of “religious creed” includes “all aspects of religious belief,
observance, and practice,” but does not specifically include religious dress or
25
grooming practices like the EEOC at the federal level.
16. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 7
(Apr. 18, 2012); see also, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardinson, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that
additional costs to give an employee Saturday off for the religious Sabbath was an undue hardship on the
employer).
17. United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 890 (3d Cir. 1990).
18. Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 261–62 (3d Cir. 2009); see also SENATE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (June 18, 2012) (discussing Webb).
19. See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that an
employee’s facial jewelry contradicts the public image that Costco aims to cultivate).
20. See Mission and History, SIKH COAL., http://www.sikhcoalition.org/about-us/mission-a-history (last
visited Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the mission and history of the Sikh
Coalition).
21. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 7 (June 18, 2012).
22. Id.
23. Birdi v. UAL Corp., No. 99 C 5576, 2002 WL 471999 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002) (holding that the
employer made a reasonable accommodation by offering the plaintiff six alternative positions that did not
involve face-to-face contact with customers after the plaintiff was terminated from his position for wearing a
religiously mandated turban against the company uniform policy). The court declared that it was unreasonable
for the plaintiff to require “face-to-face customer contact” as a reasonable accommodation because “Title VII
does not require the employer to provide the accommodation that the employee desires; any reasonable
accommodation is sufficient.” Id. at *1 (quoting EEOC v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 1997 WL 399635 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (citing Aonsonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986))).
24. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12926, 12940 (West Supp. 2012).
25. See id. § 12926(p) (defining “religious creed” as “‘religion,’ ‘religious observance,’ ‘religious
belief,’ and ‘creed’ include all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice”); see also Religious
Discrimination, supra note 7 (including types of religious dress and grooming practices in their definition).
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Similar to the federal law, California’s FEHA also requires employers to
“reasonably accommodate the religious belief or observance” unless it creates an
26
“undue hardship on the conduct of the business of the employer.” Despite the
language being similar to that in Title VII, the term “undue hardship” under
FEHA has been interpreted using higher standards and involves consideration of
27
several factors, including “significant difficulty or expense.” However, there is
confusion over whether the FEHA definition of “undue hardship” or the federal
28
de minimis standard of “undue hardship” applies in California. While the FEHA
definition of “undue hardship” applies to religion, courts have centered the higher
29
standard of “undue hardship” on persons with disabilities. Furthermore,
California courts have referred to the federal interpretation rather than using the
30
FEHA definition. Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, for example, referred to the
de minimis standard in dicta, confusing it with the correct definition of “undue
31
hardship” in California.
III. CHAPTER 287
In California, it is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire, bar from
32
training, or discriminate against persons on the basis of “religious creed.”
Chapter 287 clarifies the definition of “religious creed” to conform to the federal
provisions by including a broad range of “religious dress and grooming
33
practices.” Religious dress includes, but is not limited to, clothing, jewelry, or
34
face coverings that are in observance of a religious creed. Religious grooming
26. GOV’T § 12940(l); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 2 (June
18, 2012).
27. GOV’T § 12926(t).
“Undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in
light of the following factors: (1) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed. (2) The overall
financial resources of the facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodations, the
number of persons employed at the facility, and the effect on expenses and resources or the impact
otherwise of these accommodations upon the operation of the facility. (3) The overall financial
resources of the covered entity with respect to the number of employees, and the number, type, and
location of its facilities. (4) The type of operations, including the composition, structure, and
functions of the workforce of the entity. (5) The geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal
relationship of the facility or facilities.
Id.
28. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8
(Apr. 18, 2012).
29. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24,
2012).
30. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 5 (June 18, 2012).
31. 51 Cal. App. 4th 345, 371, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (2d Dist. 1997); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8 (Apr. 18, 2012).
32. GOV’T § 12940(a) (amended by Chapter 287).
33. Id. § 12926(p) (amended by Chapter 287).
34. Id.
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practice includes “all forms of head, facial, and body hair that are part of the
35
observance by an individual of his or her religious creed.”
Employers in California must accommodate religious observances unless the
36
accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” on the business. Chapter 287
explicitly defines “undue hardship” using the FEHA definition, eliminating
erroneous application of the federal de minimus definition in religious
37
discrimination cases.
Chapter 287 also clarifies that religious accommodation is unreasonable if it
38
“requires segregation of the individual from other employees or the public.”
Furthermore, Chapter 287 does not require a religious accommodation if the
39
accommodation is a violation of civil rights or discrimination laws.
IV. ANALYSIS
Chapter 287 clarifies that, like the EEOC, California law broadly protects
40
“religious dress practice.” It also clarifies when federal judicial interpretations
41
of religious discrimination apply to California law. As a result, Chapter 287
establishes that California law provides more religious protection in the
42
workplace than federal law.
A. The Need for Chapter 287
At an April 2012 press conference, Assembly Member Mariko Yamada and
43
members of the interfaith community announced the need to clarify FEHA.
According to Yamada, the need for change stems from evolving demographics
44
that have led to increased religious discrimination cases across the country. One
survey, for example, reported that twelve percent of Sikhs in San Francisco
45
experienced employment discrimination based on their religion. In 2011, the
EEOC reported an almost ten percent increase in employer religious

35. Id.
36. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 2 (June 18, 2012).
37. GOV’T § 12940(l)(1) (amended by Chapter 287) (clarifying that the FEHA definition of undue
hardship applies to religious protection); id. § 12926(t) (amended by Chapter 287).
38. Id. § 12940(l)(2) (amended by Chapter 287).
39. Id. § 12940(l)(3) (amended by Chapter 287).
40. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 1–2 (June 18, 2012).
41. Id.
42. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24,
2012).
43. Robin Miller, Yamada Pushes for Religious Dress Protections, REPORTER (Apr. 14, 2012),
http://www.thereporter.com/faith/ci_20396255/yamada-pushes-religious-dress-protections (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
44. Id.
45. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 6 (June 18, 2012).
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46

discrimination cases in the United States. According to Yamada, five-hundred
47
religious discrimination cases in 2011 involved California employers.
B. California as Compared to Federal Religious Protection
Chapter 287 clarifies that California provides more religious protection in the
48
workplace than does federal law. Federal law requires an employer to show that
accommodating an employee’s religious dress would be more than a de minimus
49
hardship in order to be relieved from accommodation. Chapter 287 eliminates
confusion between California and federal law by clarifying that FEHA requires
50
employers to show a “significant effect.” The “significant effect” standard
51
considers factors such as costs, resources, facilities, and the type of business. By
using the higher significant effect standard, California employees are less likely
52
to have to choose between their religious expression and their jobs.
In addition, Chapter 287 distinguishes itself from the federal interpretation of
“reasonable accommodation” illustrated in Birdi because of arguments that the
federal interpretation may allow for the “segregation of visibly religious
53
employees.” Chapter 287 responds to Birdi by establishing that accommodation
54
is not reasonable if it segregates the employee from the public. Explicitly
prohibiting segregation is consistent with Title VII and prevents employees from
55
having to choose between their religious attire and segregation.

46. Id. at 5.
47. Miller, supra note 43.
48. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24,
2012).
49. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8
(Apr. 18, 2012).
50. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(t) (amended by Chapter 287) (specifying that “undue hardship”
means “significant difficulty or expense”).
51. Id.
52. Cf. Keith Blair, Better Disabled than Devout? Why Title VII Has Failed to Provide Adequate
Accommodations Against Workplace Religious Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV. 515, 532, 556 (2010) (arguing
that the Title VII standard should be more like the Americans with Disabilities Act standard, which requires a
showing of “significant difficulty or expense,” because it would allow employees to “practice their faith without
the threat of losing their jobs because of a conflict with employment requirements”).
53. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 7 (June 18, 2012).
54. GOV’T § 12940(l)(2) (amended by Chapter 287); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 7 (June 18, 2012).
55. But see Dawinder Sidhu, Out of Sight, Out of Legal Recourse: Interpreting and Revising Title VII to
Prohibit Workplace Segregation Based on Religion, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 103, 105–06 (2012)
(arguing that the federal courts’ interpretation of undue hardship for purposes of religious accommodation under
Title VII is “inconsistent with the law” and should not allow employers to segregate employees due to
“religion-based appearance”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
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C. Anticipated Effect on Business
56

Chapter 287, sponsored by the Sikh Coalition, faced no official opposition.
Assembly Member Tim Donnelly, however, voted against Chapter 287 because
he believes it will cause an increased burden on employers and unnecessary
57
lawsuits. Congress has echoed this concern through the Workplace Religious
Freedom Act (WRFA), “an on-again off-again bill” that makes changes to Title
58
VII similar to those made by Chapter 287. In 2010, for example, Michael
Eastman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce referred to the WRFA saying “[w]e
59
are not in the habit of supporting bills that make it easier to sue our members.”
Rachel Linn, a spokeswoman for Assembly Member Yamada, however, believes
60
that by clarifying the law, Chapter 287 could prevent lawsuits. This view also
61
has support by members of the U.S. Congress. Supporters of the 2007 version of
the WRFA claimed the Act would reduce litigation because the law will
encourage “employers and employees to work out [accommodation]
62
arrangements amicably.”
It is unclear whether Chapter 287 will increase the number of religious-based
63
lawsuits in California. Similar statutes already passed in New Jersey, New
64
York, and Oregon. EEOC statistics of religious-based charges in New Jersey,
New York, and Oregon appear to be similar to all other states, but the specific
65
effect of the statutes have not been studied. Two years after New York passed a
56. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8–9
(Apr. 18, 2012).
57. Katzanek, supra note 8.
58. See Lauren Bohn, Workplace Religious Freedom Bill Finds Revived Interest, HUFFINGTON POST
(May 25, 2011), http://http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/03/workplace-religious-freed_n_561560.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the workplace religious freedom debate on Capitol Hill).
59. Id.
60. Katzanek, supra note 8.
61. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, Some Questions and Answers, INST. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Jan. 3,
2007, 9:05 PM), http://advocacy.ou.org/2007/workplace-religious-freedom-act-some-questions-and-answers/
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
62. See id. (describing that the WRFA is not expected to increase litigation because, before the law was
a de minimis standard, “the law prodded employers and employees to work out these arrangements amicably”).
63. See Eliot Spitzer, Defend the Civil Right to Freedom of Religion for America’s Workers,
FORWARD.COM (June 25, 2004), http://forward.com/articles/5867/defend-the-civil-right-to-freedom-of-religionfor/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that there was not increased litigation after New York
passed a similar statute).
64. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:5-12(q)(3) (West Supp. 2011) (stating that “undue hardship means an
accommodation requiring unreasonable expense or difficulty”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(d)(iii) (McKinney
Supp. 2012) (defining “undue burden” as “significant difficulty or expense”); OR. REV. STAT § 659A.033(4)
(2011) (defining “undue hardship” as “significant difficulty or expense”).
65. EEOC Charge Receipts by State (Includes U.S. Territories) and Basis for 2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/state_11.cfm (last visited Sept. 12,
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 2011 EEOC data indicates that New York, New Jersey, and
Oregon do not have a higher percentage of religious based EEOC charges than other states. Id. In New York,
5.9 percent of EEOC charges filed are religious based—ranking the tenth highest percentage of religious-based
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bill similar to Chapter 287, Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General, stated
that the legislation did not increase litigation and was not “burdensome on
66
business.” Instead, Spitzer claimed, it “strikes the correct balance between
accommodating individual liberty and the needs of businesses and the delivery of
67
services.” On the other hand, even some supporters of the WRFA concede that
68
raising the de minimis standard may “complicate things for employers.”
Supporters argue, however, that unknown or burdensome effects on employers
69
do not outweigh the benefits of religious freedom in the workplace. Congress is
likely to track the effects of Chapter 287 and analyze the costs and benefits in its
70
continuing efforts to pass the WRFA.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 287’s author intends the law to clarify and correct deficiencies in
71
California’s FEHA. It distinguishes California’s interpretation of “undue
hardship” from that under federal law and specifies that an employer must prove
72
“significant effects” to be relieved from accommodating an employee. In
addition, Chapter 287 clarifies that segregation is not a reasonable
73
accommodation. FEHA is a part of California public policy to protect the right
74
of all people to be employed without discrimination. Assembly Member Mariko
Yamada, the bill author, wrote that Chapter 287 both “ensures equal employment
opportunity” and “is necessary to preserve the integrity of FEHA with respect to
75
religious accommodations.”

charges. Id. In New Jersey, 4.8 percent of EEOC charges filed are religious based—ranking nineteenth out of all
states. Id. In Oregon, only 2.3 percent of EEOC charges filed are religious based—ranking forty-sixth out of all
states. Id.
66. Spitzer, supra note 63.
67. Id.
68. Bohn, supra note 58.
69. See Blair, supra note 52, at 556 (“While the cost to employers would necessarily increase under the
ADA model, that cost is outweighed by the benefits of employees being able to practice their faith without the
threat of losing their jobs because of a conflict with employment requirements.”).
70. See Bohn, supra note 58 (describing the workplace religious freedom debate on Capitol Hill).
71. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 3 (June 18, 2012).
72. Id.
73. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8
(Apr. 18, 2012).
74. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12926, 12940 (West Supp. 2012).
75. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 3 (June 18, 2012).
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